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A “Neo-feminist” Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform 
Aya Gruber∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past several decades, the slogan, “The personal is political,” has been the 
widespread rallying cry of American feminists.1 Regarding my own beliefs on the state of 
women’s subordination, the personal really became the political after I practiced as a public 
defender in a specialized domestic violence court. Prior to that, I believed that women are 
universally united and similarly situated in their subordinate status to men. I bought into the idea 
that all abused women are trapped in a cycle of violence perpetuated solely by a cunning, 
socially empowered abuser. I adhered to the concept that equal rights and the use of criminal 
strategies to combat gender crimes are the logical solutions to the problem of sexism. Of course, 
law school injected a good amount of skepticism and nuance into my thinking. Nonetheless, I 
continued to regard protecting prototypical abuse victims by throwing the book at batterers as the 
highest moral calling. 
Later, as an eager-eyed new public defender, I absolutely dreaded the prospect of 
defending horrible macho male abusers in domestic violence court. Soon, however, I began to 
dread domestic violence court for a host of other reasons. Not only did I see the rampant 
destruction of domestic relations, entrenchment of economic disempowerment, and mass 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank Shelley Cavalieri, Cyra 
Choudhury, Frank Rudy Cooper, Jorge Esquirol, Leigh Goodmark, Neil Gotanda, Jennifer Hendricks, Laura 
Kessler, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Peggie Smith, and Ahmed White for their helpful inike toput. I would also l 
express my gratitude to the editorial staff at the Journal of Gender, Race & Justice and , in particular, Rachael 
Jensen for her thoughtful edit. This short article is adapted from a speech presented at the Journal of Gender, Race 
& Justice’s 2010 Symposium, Race, Gender, and Class at a Crossroads: A Survey of Their Intersection in 
Employment, Economics, and the Law. I discuss many of the ideas in this Article in greater detail in my forthcoming 
article, Domestic Violence Law and Feminism’s Identity Crisis: Toward a “Neo-feminist” Legal Theory. 
1 See Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: WOMEN’S LIBERATION 
76 (Shulamith Firestone ed., 1970) (originating the term). 
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incarceration of minority men, but I also saw distinctly anti-female ideologies at work. I 
observed government actors systematically ignore women’s desires to stay out of court, express 
disdain for ambivalent victims, and even infantilize victims to justify mandatory policies while 
simultaneously prosecuting the victims in other contexts.2 It seemed to me that feminist criminal 
law reform had become less about critiquing the state and society’s treatment of women3 and 
more about allying with police power to find newer and better ways of putting men, who 
themselves often occupy subordinate statuses, in jail.4 
These personal experiences informed my view of feminism when I later became a law 
professor. Concerned over feminists’ embrace of the penal state and prosecutorial interventions, I 
produced critiques of feminist interventions like domestic violence mandatory arrest and 
prosecution policies.5 Because my scholarship is critical of some of the most “successful” 
feminist law reform interventions, some view it as anti-feminist. However, I never intended to 
reject or recede from feminism. Rather, I dub my analysis a “neo-feminist” critique. I agree with 
the feminist moral hierarchy dictating that non-violent relationships are better than abusive 
relationships but critique the practical operation of policies geared toward enforcing this 
                                                 
2 For a narrative description of one of my experiences in domestic violence court, see Aya Gruber, The 
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742–47, 830–33 (2007) [hereinafter Gruber, Feminist War]. 
3 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833–34 (1990) (“[L]abeling 
methods or practices or attitudes as feminist identifies them as a chosen part of a larger, critical agenda originating 
in the experiences of gender subordination.”). 
4 See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 2, at 742–47 (expressing this view); infra note 111 (discussing 
disproportionate arrest and prosecution of minority men under reformed domestic violence laws). 
5 See generally id.; see also Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV 581, 
653 (2009) [hereinafter Gruber, Rape, Feminism] (“At this particular moment, feminists ought to be consistent in 
critiquing the enormity and inhumanity of our criminal justice system, as well as its flawed premises. Women should 
not ‘walk the halls of power’ in the criminal justice system but should rather begin the complicated process of 
disentangling feminism and its important anti-sexual coercion stance from a hierarchy-reinforcing criminal system 
that is unable to produce social justice.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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hierarchy through the use of police power.6 Moreover, I accept the basic feminist premise that 
women benefit from sexual, economic, and social agency but reject that increased policing and 
prosecution of gender-based crimes within the current U.S. criminal justice structure produces 
this benefit. To me, “neo-feminism” is an appropriate name for this type of scholarship because 
the term signifies a commitment to women’s issues specifically7 and applies fittingly to analysis 
that responds to problems with past feminist interventions by utilizing novel anti-subordination 
arguments.8  
The purpose of this short Article is to place my critique of certain gender crime reforms 
and similar critiques squarely within the larger category of feminist legal theorizing. In fact, this 
Article seeks to make the case that recent feminist crime-control efforts actually represent a 
break from feminism’s largely progressive agenda. To that end, this Article discusses the alliance 
                                                 
6 See infra notes 84–102 and accompanying text (critiquing mandatory domestic violence arrest and 
prosecution policies). 
7 See Martha L.A. Fineman, Feminist Theory and Law, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 359 n.21 (1995) 
(maintaining that “[i]n a world in which gender is more than semantics, feminist legal theory cannot be gender-
neutral” but “must be woman-centered, gendered by its very nature”). 
8 When using the term “neo-feminism” at conferences, I often receive comments about possible negative 
connotations of the term. In fact, many scholars who tend to agree with the basic premises of neo-feminism, which 
will be described later in the article, feel “uncomfortable with the term.” It is true that the prefix “neo” is often used 
by critics to describe not just a new, but a radicalized and dangerous form of an already negative movement, for 
example, “neo-Nazi,” “neoconservative,” “neoliberal.” However, this is not always the case. The term “neosoul” 
movement has come to describe a very positive evolution in the soul and R & B musical genre. See Ben Ratliff, Out 
of a Rut and into a New Groove, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/23/arts/music-out-of-
a-rut-and-into-a-new-groove.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt (describing “neosoul” artists as the “antidote to the sameness 
problem: their records are more well-rounded, more musicianly, more complete”). Another example comes from 
contemporary international law scholarship, where the term “neoconstitutionalism” signifies a “post-positivist” view 
of constitutionalism in which constitutions become “the pathways through which moral values migrate from the 
ethical to the legal world.” Luis Roberto Barroso, The Americanization of Constitutional Law and Its Paradoxes: 
Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Contemporary World, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
579, 586–87 (2010). “Neo-feminism,” as I am using it, bears no relation to earlier usages of the term in the legal 
literature, which signified a form of cultural feminism. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Gale, Unfinished Women: The Supreme 
Court and the Incomplete Transformation of Women's Rights in the United States, 9 Whittier L. Rev. 445, 465 
(1987) (calling “neofeminists” “self-styled, pro-family, born-again feminists who criticize the traditional feminists 
for seeking to integrate women into a man's world—believe that most women's priorities do center around home and 
family life, and that the law properly provides special benefits for women workers because of their special role as 
mothers”) (footnotes omitted).  
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between feminism and crime-control ideologies and how an initially progressive set of ideas 
ended up bolstering conservative ideologies regarding social disorder and undergirding a highly 
authoritarian, ubiquitous governance structure―the criminal justice system. The Article then 
turns to the critique of feminist criminalization strategies in an effort to demonstrate that 
questioning such tactics can inure to the benefit rather than detriment of women victims. Finally, 
it will conclude with some formative remarks on “neo-feminist” scholarship in general. 
II. THE TRAJECTORY OF FEMINIST CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 
Among criminal law scholars, the common wisdom is that the U.S. penal system is, in 
many ways, broken.9 Especially for progressives, the state of American penal law is 
intolerable.10 Civil libertarians assert that the criminal justice system treats defendants unfairly 
by inadequately protecting their individual rights.11 Understanding the limits of the liberal 
critique,12 race scholars have set forth many arguments that pinpoint the myriad of ways in 
                                                 
9 See J.C. Oleson, The Punitive Coma, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 829, 830 (2002) (“Throughout the last twenty 
years, the American rate of incarceration has grown dramatically. More than two million people are currently held in 
American prisons and jails.”); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913 (2007) 
(observing that “the United States leads the world by imprisoning 750 people out of every 100,000 citizens, while 
almost every European country ranges between 100 and 200”).  
10 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225–26, 228-233 (2007) 
(discussing the various critiques of U.S. criminal law policy); see, e.g., David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The 
Paradox of Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2001) (criticizing penal severity in the 
United States); David Rudovsky, A Closing Keynote: A Comment on Mass Incarceration in the United States, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 207 & passim (2008) (objecting to America’s “era of mass incarceration”). 
11 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the 
Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783 (1997); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal 
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the 
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always 
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995); George C. Thomas III, The 
Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 
(2005).  
12 Rights-rhetoric does little to address the socio-cultural, economic, and racial conditions that make certain 
groups particularly vulnerable to police power. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical 
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1058–59 (1982) (asserting that legal decisions 
cannot be “rationally justified” by the “inherent logic of rights”). 
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which conscious and unconscious racism condition the modern American carceral regime.13 Left 
scholars have also chimed in with a more Marxist assessment of criminal justice as reinforcing 
and reflecting the economic oppression of the lower classes.14  
While progressive civil libertarians, critical race theorists, and left scholars have voiced 
concerns over the monolithic and authoritarian U.S. criminal justice system, another powerful 
progressive group―feminists―have been noticeably absent from this critique. Feminists rather 
tend to regard the criminal system as an effective and desirable method of ending gender-based 
violence.15 Today, feminist reformers have been very successful in changing the dynamics of the 
criminal system regarding rape and domestic violence. Changes in rape laws, like rape shield 
statutes and affirmative consent doctrines, seek to make it easier to prosecute rape cases and to 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (suggesting that jury nullification can temper the criminal justice system’s 
disproportionately negative effects on black communities); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 31–37 (1998) (observing that prosecutorial discretion is affected 
by unconscious racism); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil 
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275–
76 (2004) (“For the most part, the data consistently show disproportionate searches of African-American and 
Hispanic motorists in relation to their estimated representation on the road.”); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial 
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and 
the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010) (stating that “the use of racial profiling by 
law enforcement authorities in the United States has long been permitted and encouraged, if not expressly 
authorized, by U.S. constitutional law”; Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 404–09 (1996) (noting the ways in which socially 
constructed images of ethnic minorities affect jurors in self-defense cases); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and 
Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274–76 (2004) 
(describing the phenomenon of mass incarceration of African Americans).  
14 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY 97–102 (2001); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS 
(1999) 32−55; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007);; Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social 
Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759(2005) (arguing that 
mass incarceration in the United States is a product capitalism’s endemic problem of surplus labor during times of 
fiscal crisis). 
15 See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 302 (2006) 
(observing the “perceived success of feminist rape law”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle 
Merry, Renée Römkens & Marianne Wesson, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 344 
(2002) (querying whether “the feminist social movement [is] to be remembered for its influence on criminal law”). 
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ensure that prosecutors, judges, and jurors adjudicate sexual violence cases on the basis of facts 
and not social norms about appropriate female behavior.16 In the domestic violence context, 
reformers’ achievements include extensive adoption of mandatory arrest laws and pro-
prosecution policies that seek to counter police, prosecutor, and even victim ambivalence.17 
Many progressives aggressively criticize feminism’s bolstering of the penal state and its 
other seemingly illiberal choices: such as reifying an essentialist vision of womanhood, ignoring 
other forms of subordination, and downplaying critiques of capitalism. Class critics dismiss 
feminism for its complicity in maintaining the capitalist state apparatus.18 Critical Race theorists 
oppose feminism’s tendency to marginalize minority women19 and to exacerbate the 
subordination of minority men.20 Postmodern scholars “take a break” from feminism because of 
                                                 
16 See infra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
18 See, e.g., CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION 16 (1989) 
(observing the rejection of liberal feminism on the ground that it “has appealed to bourgeois or middle-class women 
within national movements, rather than to the millions of working-class, rural, and destitute women who make up 
the majority of the world's female population”); Regina Austin & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Joe Frug's 
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto Ten Years Later: Reflections on the State of Feminism Today, 36 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001) (comment by Regina Austin) (“A ‘feminist’ theory that works to liberate one group of women 
(Western, bourgeois professional women, for example) may result in the oppression of another (poor immigrant 
domestic workers of color, for example).”).  
19 See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 23 (1984) (observing that minority 
women “dismiss the term [feminism] because they do not wish to be perceived as supporting a racist movement”); 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of  
Antisicrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 154 (1989) 
(“The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves from a white racial context that is 
seldom acknowledged.”). 
20 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (2010) 
(contending that “in attempting to eradicate sexism in rape laws, feminist scholars have entrenched an approach to 
analyzing rape allegations that is, if not overtly racist, very much racialized”).  
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its instantiation of a view of women as morally superior and its privileging of women in 
particular as the recipients of legal efforts.21  
Nonetheless, it is easy to see why feminists embraced crime control as a tool of women’s 
liberation. Stopping gender violence is a good thing, and perhaps the feminist intervention could 
have a positive effect on the criminal justice system. Perhaps it could make police and state 
actors more conscious of universal social inequality. Unfortunately, changing the systemic 
inclinations of criminal justice is not easily achieved, and rather than the criminal justice system 
adopting a feminist agenda, feminist reformers essentially adopted the criminal justice system’s 
agenda.  
A. Liberal Origins 
Feminist efforts to reform the criminal law really began in the era called the “second-
wave” of feminism―the period of the late 1960s through the early 1990s.22 Any discussion of 
second-wave feminism should begin with so-called liberal feminism. Liberal feminism is most 
closely associated with women’s liberationist efforts to bolster women’s autonomy and secure 
formal equality between the sexes.23 In rape law, for example, the liberal idea was that the key to 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY xxix 
(supporting “a new shape of politics [that] emerges when identity as a common ground no longer constrains the 
discourse on feminist politics”) (1990); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM 
FEMINISM 17–18 (2006) (critiquing what she describes as the principal characteristic of American feminism—
distinguishing between male and female (“m/f”), prioritizing female over male (“f>m”), and advocating legally for 
that prioritization (“Carrying a Brief for f”)).  
22 See Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in Family Law, 85 IND. 
L.J. 893, 950 (2010) (describing the “second-wave of feminism” as “stretching from the 1960s until the 1990s”). 
23 See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism’s Visions of the 
“Progress” of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 153, 154 n.2 (2009) (noting that liberal feminists “share 
liberalism’s political agenda of individual autonomy, equal rights, and a commitment to liberal democracy”); Linda 
C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CALIF. L. REV. 




women’s empowerment in the sexual arena was ensuring that sex was consensual.24 To achieve 
formal equality within the criminal justice system, feminists advocated eliminating sexist legal 
barriers to criminal prosecution, like corroboration25 and resistance requirements,26 and to 
reorient the trial to focus on the question of consent.27  
The efforts to reform rape law through the prism of equal rights quickly exposed the 
limits of liberalism. Eliminating the formal prosecution barriers did little to address the cultural 
norms that led victims, police, and prosecutors to be reluctant to prosecute and juries to be 
reluctant to convict.28 Although the law no longer a priori declared women incredible in the 
absence of clear corroboration, most commonly serious injury, prosecutors still looked for such 
evidence in their case prioritization decisions, as did jurors in their decision-making.29 Although 
                                                 
24 See Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of Violence 
Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38 (1995) (observing that “liberal feminism” shaped rape 
reform in the “classic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy, and individual choice”).  
25 See, e.g., Lore v. Smith, 256 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 (N. Rochelle City Ct. 1965) (“There must be other proof 
that an act of sexual intercourse occurred at the time and place charged, and that the complainant's disclosure even if 
made promptly does not constitute the sole basis for sufficient corroboration”)(citations omitted). 
26 See, e.g., McLain v. State, 149 N.W. 771, 771 (Wis. 1914) (“[T]here must be the utmost resistance by the 
woman by all means within her power.” (citing Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906)). 
27 See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962–68 (1998) 
(discussing the evolution and eventual abolition of the resistance requirement, including reformers’ roles); Gruber, 
Rape, Feminism, supra note 5, at 593 (“Spurred on by feminists, liberals, and prominent female politicians, courts 
and legislatures began to systematically eliminate resistance and corroboration requirements.”). 
28 See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 passim (1986) (analyzing rape myths); id. 1177–
79 (discussing jurors’ focus on acquaintance of victim to defendant, corroboration, and victim precipitation); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1104–13 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, 
REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987) (discussing influence of rape myths 
on judges’ constructions of facts)). 
29 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 7 (1999) (maintaining that, 
despite elimination of the requirement, juries still demand corroboration); see also Richard Klein, An Analysis of 
Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 1049 
(2008) (noting that jurors typically want more than the victim’s word); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading 
About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 995 n.58 (1993) (citing a survey in which thirty-eight percent of 
men and thirty-seven percent of women indicated a seductively dressed woman is partly responsible for rape). 
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the law no longer required women to act like “ideal” victims by displaying “the utmost 
resistance,” jurors continued to assume that victims, who did not resist, especially those with 
“precipitating” attributes, either could not have been raped or deserved to be raped.30 
A similar genealogy characterizes domestic violence reform. It is true that in order to 
achieve social change, early reformers worked outside the liberal paradigm and adopted a more 
distributive approach to remedying battering; advocates initially argued for economic and social 
support for abuse victims, like battered women’s shelters and counseling.31 Nevertheless, many 
of the early arguments for legal transformation were packaged in the name of equality.32 Similar 
to rape reformers’ contention that rape is a crime of violence and not just imperfect private sex,33 
feminists opining on domestic violence asserted that battering was a true violent crime and not 
an issue about the private relationship between husband and wife.34 Feminists found, however, 
that simply creating legal access could not work given social and institutional resistance. 
Although the law formally treated spousal battering like any other criminal assault, police, 
                                                 
30 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape (and 
Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 155 (2007) (“[E]ven the most well-meaning[] ‘feminist’ jurors may find 
that they have reasonable doubt about the . . . rape case . . . if the tale told fits cultural stories about ‘sluttish 
women.’”). 
31 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2004) (describing the early battered women’s movement as a “grassroots effort to 
provide services and shelter to domestic violence victims, independent of state involvement”). 
32 See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1881–82 (1996) (“The underenforcement of domestic violence laws and the refusal to mandate 
participation for certain groups ultimately denies women legitimate state protection and enforcement of the right to 
be free from violence in their homes and in their communities. An equal and effective response to domestic violence 
requires that all citizens be subject to the same prosecution policies.”). 
33 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 369, 377 (1975) 
(asserting that rape should be “placed where it truly belongs, within the context of modern criminal violence and not 
within the purview of ancient masculine codes”). 
34 See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 13 (1999) (“Since the early 1970s, battered 
women's advocates have called upon police and prosecutors to treat domestic violence ‘like any other crime.’”). 
10 
 
prosecutors, judges, and jurors did not necessarily see it that way. State actors continued to 
downplay the seriousness of domestic violence cases either because of chauvinistic 
predispositions or because of skepticism regarding the prospects of prosecutorial success.35  
B. The Authoritarian Turn 
As feminist scholars responded to the limits of liberal reform efforts, feminism, a 
quintessentially progressive movement, veered in a curious direction. In responding to the failure 
of equal opportunity to bring about substantive results,36 certain feminist legal theories moved 
toward authoritarian policies and obdurate views of right and wrong. So-called “dominance” 
feminism, associated most readily with the writings of Catharine MacKinnon,37 for example, 
views the inequality of men and women, not solely as a matter of unequal rights and formal 
institutional disparities, but as a matter of the ubiquitous power differential between men and 
women in all aspects of life.38 From the point of view of dominance feminists, establishing 
uniform rights would not adequately address the “patriarchy,” 39 a system of norms, practices, 
                                                 
35 See Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An 
Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 312 (2004) (discussing police 
failure to respond quickly to domestic violence reports and failure to arrest perpetrators because police view these 
disputes as less criminally serious); Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy 
Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 942–43 (1999) (attributing prosecutor reluctance to the belief that domestic 
violence is a private problem and victims are reluctant to pursue charges). 
 36 Supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
37 See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: 
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 81, 81–82 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) [hereinafter 
MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, THEORY OF STATE]. 
38 See Mackinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 37, at 87 (asserting that gender is “a question of 
power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination”). 
39 See Robin L. West, Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 421 (2005) (describing patriarchy in 
dominance feminism as “the ubiquitous controls of women’s work, reproduction, children, and property, across 
cultures and across time, [which] are aimed at the appropriation of female sexuality”). 
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instincts, and signals that keeps men dominant and women subordinate.40 While many 
progressive theories emphasize social conditions that render claims of rights-based neutrality 
suspect, dominance feminism differs in that it regards sexuality in particular as the singular cause 
of women’s social inequality.41  
In defining the patriarchal structure as a sexual structure, dominance feminism centers on 
a fairly uncompromising and absolutist idea of bad and good—bad being things that sexualize 
women and good being the eradication of those things through prohibitory law.42 In addition, 
dominance feminism’s refusal to link feminism to Marxism and view gender subordination as a 
subset of the larger problem of economic inequality resulted in its embracing prosecutorial rather 
than distributive solutions to the problem of sexual domination.43 Dominance feminism 
accordingly calls for the reversal of the gender power structure by utilizing penal law to stamp 
out instances of sexual domination.44  
                                                 
40 See MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 37, at 84 (rejecting the “liberal idealism” 
because “virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively compensated in this 
society”). 
41 See MACKINNON, THEORY OF STATE, supra note 37, at 195 (asserting that sexualization “is a central 
feature of women’s social definition as inferior and feminine”). 
42 See id. at 245–46 (condemning “the systemic failure of the state to enforce the rape law” as reinforcing 
male supremacy). 
43 MacKinnon considers gender, not class, as “the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in 
history.” Id. at 116. For a larger discussion of MacKinnon’s view of socialism and distributive reform, see Aya 
Gruber, Neofeminism (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
44 See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the 
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 341 (2006) (asserting that governance 
feminism is  a “very state-centered, top-down, sovereigntist” feminism that “emphasizes criminal enforcement,” 
“speaks the language of total prohibition,” and “envisions the legal levers it pulls as activating a highly monolithic 
and state-centered form of power” ). Id. at 345–46, 349–50 & 422 (discussing how MacKinnon’s philosophy helped 
create and reinforcegovernance feminist ideas). 
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In the rape context, the dominance intervention directly and indirectly led to reforms that 
were largely protective of victims during trial. Civil libertarians assert that these protections 
often come at the expense of a fair trial.45 Rape shield laws seek to cloak the rape complainant in 
a degree of privacy, requiring courts to presumptively exclude sexual information that could 
prejudice a jury.46 Affirmative consent standards, which define sexual assault as intercourse in 
the absence of an affirmative expression of consent,47 aim to serve two equalizing functions. The 
first is to focus the trial on the actual communication between the defendant and complainant.48 
The second is to help transform the view of consensual sex from intercourse where the reluctant 
party has failed to meet the communicative burden of voicing nonconsent to intercourse where 
the person desiring sex has met the communicative burden of obtaining consent.49 Outside of the 
trial forum, prosecutor’s offices reorganized themselves to include sex crimes “units,” in which 
the attorneys developed “expertise” in rape cases and exhibited particular sensitivity toward rape 
victims.50 The evidentiary and substantive law reforms obviously served to disadvantage 
                                                 
45 See generally Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 5, at 614–15. (discussing civil libertarian critiques of 
rape reform). 
46 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (excluding evidence that victim “engaged in other sexual behavior” and 
evidence of “victim’s sexual predisposition”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (1983) (prohibiting “[e]vidence of 
the reputation of a victim’s sexual conduct” and “[e]vidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual conduct”). 
47 See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (redefining forcible rape as sexual intercourse 
without affirmative consent). 
48 See id. at 1274 (characterizing the affirmative consent doctrine as a response to the old law’s tendency to 
put the victim on trial). 
49 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2181 
(1995) (analogizing person who desires sex to a surgeon who must get permission before bodily invasion). 
50 See Anna Y. Joo, Note, Broadening the Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of 
the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 266 (1995) (“Increased reporting of rape is often credited to 
the establishment of sex crime units by law enforcement agencies, survivor advocates in rape crisis centers, survivor 
specialists in prosecutor's offices, and survivor counselors in hospitals.”). But see Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy 
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defendants, who, feminists asserted, had been unfairly benefitting from sexist cultural beliefs all 
along.51 From the neo-feminist perspective, however, the issue is whether the changes benefitted 
women victims and furthered the larger goal of gender equality. This Article will return to this 
issue a bit later on.52 
Domestic violence law reform efforts, while less directly linked to dominance feminism 
because of the theory’s preoccupation with sexual domination in particular,53 also moved away 
from liberal and distributive commitments toward authoritarian and paternalistic policies to curb 
abuse. As with rape law, the formal legal equality of domestic abuse to other assault crimes 
failed to achieve widespread substantive results because of greater social and cultural forces. 
State actors and lay people alike viewed domestic violence complainants who stayed with 
abusers with the same jaundiced eye as rape victims who were voluntary companions of 
defendants.54 As with rape cases, prosecutors often wrote off domestic violence trials as “un-
winnable.”55 Like rape victims, domestic violence victims were often reluctant to enter and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 706 
(2006) (citing a study of a Chicago sexual assault prosecution unit finding that prosecutors based charging decisions 
on the likelihood of juror empathy with the victim). 
51 See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 663, 682 (1998) (observing that criminal prosecutions proceed against a backdrop of “the patriarchal 
tale of rape that our culture inculcates and that we use to measure the credibility of any given charge of rape”); 
Megan Reidy, The Impact of Media Coverage on Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a 
“Fair Trial”?, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 297, 299 (2004) (asserting that “defense attorneys, in an effort to exonerate their 
clients, challenge rape victims’ testimony and credibility through an attack on the victims’ sexuality”). 
 52 See infra Part IV.B.  
 53 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  
54 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice 
in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 557 (1992) (The immediate question for most people when they 
first hear about the problems of battered women is “why don't they leave?”). 
55 See O’Connor, supra note 35 (attributing prosecutor reluctance to the belief that domestic violence is a 
private problem and victims are reluctant to pursue charges). 
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remain in the criminal process for a variety of reasons explored below.56 As noted above, 
favored feminist legal response in the rape context was to make the criminal process more 
comfortable for the victim by excluding embarrassing sexual evidence and focusing the trial on 
the issue of consent expression.57 Making the criminal process a kinder and gentler experience 
for rape complainants was feminists’ preferred solution to the problem of victims’ participatory 
reluctance. But something quite different happened with domestic violence reform. 
It is true that some of the domestic violence reforms were similar to rape reforms. For 
example, prosecutors’ offices today often boast specialized domestic violence units. However, 
where rape shield laws and affirmative consent standards seek to prevent jurors from focusing on 
rape precipitation issues (her short skirt, her accompanying him to his apartment, her sex with 
past partners),58 no similar legal technology exists to focus jurors in domestic violence cases 
away from the main precipitation question in that context (why doesn’t she leave?). 
Nevertheless, one innovation has been to simply take domestic violence cases out of the hands of 
jurors altogether by prosecuting such cases as simple assaults meriting bench trials in front of 
specially trained domestic violence judges.59  
Where domestic violence reform diverged most sharply from rape reform was in dealing 
with reluctant complainants. Instead of just relying on a more victim-friendly process to 
                                                 
56 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 57 Supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.  
 
58 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
59 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 44–49 (1999) (noting that judges assigned 
to the District of Columbia domestic violence court are “required to undergo formal training on intimate abuse”); 
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006) (describing the domestic violence system as a 
misdemeanor system, in which judges play a prominent role). 
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encourage complainants to participate, domestic violence reformers advocated and often 
achieved more radical legal and policy restructurings. Domestic violence reform advocates 
lobbied legislatures to enact laws mandating that police arrest any suspect the police had 
probable cause to believe committed a domestic assault, or at least laws excepting domestic 
assaults from the typical rules requiring warrants for misdemeanor arrests.60 Reformers also 
encouraged legislatures and prosecutors’ offices to implement pro-prosecution policies in 
domestic violence cases.61 As a result of this lobbying, states overwhelmingly changed their 
arrest laws.62 Many mandated prosecutorial prioritization of domestic violence cases, thereby 
limiting the wide discretion to dismiss difficult-to-prove cases that prosecutors typically enjoy, 
and prosecutors’ offices adopted domestic violence “no-drop” procedures as a matter of their 
own policy.63 Rather than making the criminal process a more positive experience for victims, 
such policies ignored the wishes of ambivalent or non-prosecutorial victims and even caused 
                                                 
60 See Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the 
Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 289–91 (1997) (discussing feminist 
reformers lobbying efforts in favor of mandatory arrest laws).  
61 See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 550, 564–65 (1999) (noting lobbying efforts to secure mandatory arrest and prosecution policies). 
62 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (B) (2010) (allowing warrantless arrest for domestic 
violence, but only mandating arrest in cases of “physical injury”). Many mandate arrest in all cases of suspected 
domestic violence. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2008); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6(1) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.31.100 (2006) (mandating arrest in domestic violence cases). 
63 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West 2010) (“The state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a 
pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, and an intake policy and procedures 
coordinated with the clerk of court for violations of injunctions for protection against domestic violence.”); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 611A.0311(2)(4) (2009) (mandating “procedures to encourage the prosecution of all domestic abuse 
cases where a crime can be proven”). 
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certain victims material harm.64 The next two parts of the Article explore the responses to the 
authoritarian turn in feminist theorizing and activism regarding rape and intimate abuse. 
III. CRITIQUES OF FEMINIST CRIMINAL LAW REFORM THAT ARE NON-FEMINIST RATHER 
THAN NEO-FEMINIST 
 
The critiques of rape and domestic violence law that this Article lays out in Part IV and 
identify as “neo-feminist” are feminist viewpoints in the sense that they centralize the non-
subordination of women. Yet, they break from the orthodox view that the feminist approach to 
the problem of gender crimes ought to be strengthening the prosecutorial apparatus. In this sense, 
neo-feminist critiques are distinct from the many critiques of rape and domestic violence reforms 
that are not based in an effort to remedy gender subordination. Indeed, the non-liberal yet 
female-centric nature of these reforms has led to vocal attacks from both the right and the left. 
Because it is often easiest to understand what something is by highlighting that which it is not, 
elucidating the critiques of gender-crime reform that come from outside the feminist movement 
should further the conceptualization of the critique in Part IV as neo-feminist. Accordingly, the 
following sections will briefly examine the major non-feminist objections to domestic violence 
and rape reform, some of which are distinctly anti-feminist. 
A. Anti-feminist Critiques 
Certain conservatives have been vocal in condemning affirmative consent policies as 
nothing more than a hysterical response to mythical reports of rampant college date rape.65 In 
agreement with popular ridicule of the notion of a “sex contract,”66 they denigrate affirmative 
                                                 
64 See infra Part IV.A. 
65 See, e.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 39–44 (1993). 
66 See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 689 (1999) (noting “[t]he popular 
rejection of verbal communication in the sexual context”). 
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consent requirements as paternalistic and ruining the mystique of cryptic sexual 
communications.67 Others counter rape law reform efforts in a less doctrinal manner by 
constantly publicizing the notion that there is widespread fabrication of rape and pointing to 
“irrefutable” empirical evidence.68 In the domestic violence arena, so-called “men’s rights” 
groups characterize the domestic violence process as facilitating the ability of angry women to 
ruin men’s lives by making up domestic violence claims in order to obtain restraining orders, 
facilitate a desired arrest, or gain the upper hand in divorce and custody proceedings.69 However, 
despite popular resistance to date rape criminalization and certain men’s frustration with 
women’s “unfair advantages” in domestic violence court, conservatives have generally 
welcomed amplified efforts to incarcerate sex offenders and the concept of “throwing the book” 
at batterers.70 This Article  will discuss later the cultural narrative that conditions conservative 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., ROIPHE, supra note 65, at 62 (arguing that affirmative consent “proposes that women, like 
children, have trouble communicating what they want”); Camille Paglia, Madonna—Finally, a Real Feminist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/14/opinion/madonna-finally-a-real-feminist.html (asserting 
that “‘[n]o’ has always been, and always will be, part of the dangerous, alluring courtship ritual of sex and 
seduction . . . .”). 
68 See, e.g., Edward Greer, The Truth Behind Legal Dominance Feminism’s “Two Percent False Rape 
Claim” Figure, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 947, 948–49 (2000) (arguing that rape reform agenda might be reasonable if 
false reporting were rare, but because it is frequent, feminist rape efforts “are truly destructive”). 
69The Nat’l Fathers' Res. Ctr., Domestic Violence, FATHERS4KIDS.COM, 
http://www.fathers4kids.com/html/DomesticViolence.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012) (“Fathers’ organizations now 
estimate that up to 80% of domestic violence allegations against men are false allegations. Since society offers 
women so many perks for claiming that they are victims of DV . . . false or staged DV allegations now appear to be 
even more frequent in family court cases than false sex abuse allegations.”); cf. Phyllis Schlafly, Domestic Violence 
Law Abuses Rights of Men, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 12, 2006, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060512/news_lz1e12schlafl.html (“Knowing that a woman can get a 
restraining order against the father of her children in an ex parte proceeding without any evidence, and that she will 
never be punished for lying, domestic-violence accusations have become a major tactic for securing sole child 
custody.”). 
70 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Domestic Violence Prevention (Oct. 8, 
2003), (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-
5.html) (last visited Feb. 8, 2012) (stating that the “government is engaged in the fight” against domestic violence 
through prosecutors who are “finding the abusers, and . . . throwing the book at them”). 
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support for tough treatment of rapists and abusers and how it directly undermines the 
transformative potential of the feminist criminal law reform project.71 
B. Civil Libertarian Critiques 
Probably the most familiar critical analyses of domestic violence and especially rape 
reform come from left-leaning civil libertarians concerned with defendants’ rights. Civil 
libertarians assert that the novel evidentiary rules peculiar to rape and domestic violence cases 
have the effect of denying defendants in those cases the right to a fair trial. For example, they 
claim that rape shield laws can exclude relevant evidence of innocence in certain cases.72 In the 
domestic violence context, civil libertarian critics contended, and the Supreme Court agreed, that 
domestic violence prosecutors’ practice of introducing any and all extrajudicial victim statements 
as “excited utterances” violated defendants’ confrontation rights.73 In addition to the claim that 
rape reforms impinge on defendants’ trial rights, there is the more generalized liberal contention 
that affirmative consent standards are incompatible with the “harm principle” (the government 
should not sanction harmless behavior)74 because in essence they treat sex premised on botched 
communications as the “ultimate” crime of rape.75  
                                                 
 71 See infra notes 132–48 and accompanying text. 
72 See, e.g., David S. Rudenstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1 (1976); Shawn J. Wallach, Student Note, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the 
Defendant’s Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485 (1997).  
73 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (finding that admission of the alleged domestic violence 
victims’ statements in response to police investigative questioning violated the defendant’s confrontation rights). 
74 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859) (“[T]he 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.”). 
75 See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line Between 
Forcible Rape and Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1112 (2007) (“It is wrong to use the strong 
arm of the criminal law to impose rules intended to change societal or cultural attitudes when doing so transforms 
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C. Critical Race and Leftist Critiques 
Finally, there are the critical race and leftist assessments of rape and domestic violence 
reform. Critical race theorists point out that feminist rape reformers have essentially ignored 
historical evidence that white society deployed sex crime laws as means of racial persecution.76 
They also condemn toughened rape and domestic violence laws for disproportionately harming 
minority and immigrant men, and by extension, communities of color.77 There is also the 
familiar argument that feminist criminal law reform has right-leaning political valence because it 
strengthens the operation of criminal law. 78 Law and society theorists catalog the shift from 
alternative forms of governance and informal mechanisms of crime control to “governing 
through crime.”79 Today, the penal system has grown into an enormous state bureaucracythat 
asserts direct and indirect control over the majority of Americans’ lives.80 The rise of the 
American penal state is also troubling from the left perspective because it helped facilitate the 
retrenchment of the welfare state and denigrate communitarian values in the eyes of the public.81 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct that many members of the community would regard as, at most, unreasonable into one of the worst kinds of 
criminal offenses.”). 
76 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 599 
(1990) (observing that for many black women, rape has come to “signif[y] the terrorism of black men by white men, 
aided and abetted, passively (by silence) or actively (by ‘crying rape’), by white women.”). 
77 See, e.g., Capers, supra note 20, at 1364 (observing that by advocating rape reform, “in attempting to 
eradicate sexism . . . feminist scholars have entrenched an approach to analyzing rape allegations that is, if not 
overtly racist, very much racialized”). 
78 See, e.g., Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform 
Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 153 (1998) (lamenting feminism’s connection to the criminal system, whose 
purpose is to “control the ‘dangerous classes’ and to perpetuate and replicate existing power relations”). 
79 See generally SIMON, supra note 14. 
80 See id. at 6 (asserting that governing through crime “fuels a culture of fear and control that inevitably 
lowers the threshold of fear even as it places greater and greater burdens on ordinary Americans”). 
81 See infra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
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The above-discussed critiques are not themselves feminist critiques, although the critical 
race and class-based arguments can be connected to the larger feminist program, as this Article 
will discuss later.82 The arguments are non-feminist because they do not reject gender-crime law 
reform on the particular ground that it actually disserves individual women and is damaging to 
the greater goals of feminism. However, feminist criminal law reform has engendered numerous 
internal critiques that do scrutinize the relationship between such reform and women’s 
subordination. These neo-feminist analyses recognize that gender-based crimes are serious 
problems meriting feminist concern and that society’s historically lackadaisical attitude toward 
gender-based crime evidences significant social inequality. Nevertheless, these theories criticize 
rape and domestic violence reform on the basis of two realizations: (1) that certain aspects of 
feminist efforts within criminal law have intended and unintended negative repercussions for 
women, especially the poor and minority women most vulnerable to violence and most 
desperately in need of cultural, institutional, and economic reform; and (2) that aspects of 
feminist criminal law reform are thus incompatible with the larger feminist “commitment to a 
more egalitarian distributive structure and a greater sense of collective responsibility.”83  
IV. NEO-FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF FEMINIST CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 
Neo-feminist scholarship maintains a commitment to women’s issues specifically, 
although it is critical of certain aspects of feminism-driven criminal law reform. In discussing the 
neo-feminist evaluations of domestic violence and rape reform, this Article will elucidate the 
easier critique of the domestic violence system before tackling the more difficult appraisal of 
rape reform. Expounding the drawbacks of domestic violence reform from a woman-centric 
                                                 
 82 See infra notes 95–99, 106–111 and accompanying text.  
83 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (1994). 
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position is a less taxing enterprise than critiquing rape reform because of the obviously illiberal 
nature of mandatory policing and prosecutorial policies and the attendant essentialist 
assumptions about battered women’s psychology.  
A. Critiques of Domestic Violence Reform 
Critics argue that the slate of prosecutorial domestic violence reforms advocated by 
feminists actually disempowers women in both direct and indirect ways.84 Turning first to the 
direct negative effects, many scholars note that mandatory policies inevitably force certain 
domestic violence victims to proceed with prosecutions that they would rather avoid for a variety 
of reasons.85 Not only is this situation at odds with the central feminist tenet of women’s 
empowerment and autonomy, it may actually cause more harm than good. 
Critical feminists contend that reformers’ assumption that battered women do not know 
how best to keep safe is empirically unjustified and that their practice of forcing reluctant women 
to prosecute may actually imperil the women more than not prosecuting.86 Moreover, there is the 
argument that forced prosecution can have devastating effects on the victim’s financial health 
and family structure.87 In addition, mandatory policies have led to prosecutors charging the 
                                                 
84 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in 
Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (contending that “policy choices, like no-drop 
prosecution and bans on mediating in domestic violence cases, are . . . marked by their denial of decisionmaking to 
women who have been battered”). 
85 Infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.  
86 See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ 
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 469 
(2003) (asserting that the harm of no-drop policies “is twofold: the prosecution may have failed to make the victim 
safe from future attacks and, in addition, by coercing the victim’s participation the state may have taught her to 
distrust the system”). 
87 See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of 
Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1017–18 (2000) (noting that “without the batterer’s income or his assistance 
with childcare, for example, women may lose jobs, housing, and even their children”); Judith G. Greenberg, 
Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 415 (2005) (citing 
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abuse victims, themselves, for domestic abuse and other criminal offenses.88 Unfortunately, 
women who exist at the intersection of multiple axes of subordination (race, immigrant status, 
income level) appear to suffer the most under mandatory policies.89  
Even the aspects of domestic violence reform separate from mandatory policies are, at 
best, double-edged swords when it comes to bettering the lives of the women victims. Take, for 
example, specialized domestic violence courts with trained judges. On the one hand, such 
judicial specialization can have the salutary effect of helping to ensure that abuse cases are not 
adjudicated in front of juries or jurists that harbor chauvinistic assumptions about domestic 
violence (e.g., victims often lie; if abuse was really that bad she would leave; domestic violence 
is a private matter).90 Thus, specialized courts at their best have the potential to provide a fair 
forum for adjudication and a positive experience for crime victims. On the other hand, trained 
judges may have the tendency to internalize the essentialist characterization of domestic violence 
victims as coerced and damaged, discussed below.91 As a result, they may paternalistically 
                                                                                                                                                             
Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7 ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (Jan. 31, 
2002), http://www.nursingworld.org/ojin/topic17/tpc17_3.htm (last visited Feb.5, 2012) (observing that women fail 
to prosecute abuse for reasons including “desire to keep the family unit intact,  concern for their children, [and] 
emotional attachment to the abuser”)). 
88 See L. Kevin Hamberger & Theresa Potente, Counseling Heterosexual Women Arrested for Domestic 
Violence: Implications for Theory and Practice, in 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 125, 126 (1994) (finding that mandatory 
arrest law resulted in twelve-fold increase in arrests of women, but only a two-fold increase for men). 
89 See Coker, supra note 87, at 1047 (noting that “[p]oor women of color are particularly vulnerable” to 
suffering negative consequences from mandatory domestic violence policies); see generally Hannah R. Shapiro, 
Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the Intersection of U.S. Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and 
Remedies, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2002) (discussing the adverse impact of mandatory domestic-violence 
policies on immigrant victims). 
90 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
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prioritize their judgment of what is best for the woman over the woman’s actual desires by, for 
example, refusing to lift a no-contact order when a victim requests it.92 
Feminist critics of domestic violence reform also note the more inchoate harms of 
mandatory policies both to battering victims specifically and subordinated women generally. In 
order to produce the legal conclusion that mandatory policies benefit abuse victims and are 
therefore what they “should” want, reformers had to come up with a set of arguments to justify 
dismissing the choices of non-prosecutorial victims. The stock argument in support of mandatory 
arrest and prosecution is seductively logical: Because batterers coercively control abuse victims, 
allowing victims to decline arrest and prosecution essentially cedes power over the criminal 
process to the batterer.93 In order to support this scared-or-prosecutorial dichotomy, however, 
advocates bought into and even publicized an essentialist and objectifying script that portrayed 
victims as paralyzed by fear, weak-willed, and even automaton-like.94  
The reductionist characterization of all abused women as simply too scared to prosecute 
hides the complex reality of many battered women’s lives.95 Abused women decline to ally with 
                                                 
92 See Mary Becker, Keynote Address, Symposium, Domestic Violence and Victimizing the Victim: Relief, 
Results, Reform, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 487–88 (2003) (cautioning that domestic violence education “is not 
necessarily effective and can reinforce stereotypes and actually do harm”). 
93 See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for 
Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 687 (1997) (“Because batterers have such overwhelming 
control over their victims, and the system required victims to control the prosecution, batterers, in effect, were being 
given control over the disposition of their own criminal case.”). Some also repeat the prosecutorial mantra that 
battering is a crime against the state, and therefore the victim’s wishes should not control the fate of the prosecution. 
See, e.g., Toni L. Harvey, Student Work, Batterers Beware: West Virginia Responds to Domestic Violence with the 
Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statute, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 181, 205 (1994) (asserting that tough criminalization 
policies “ensure that domestic violence will be perceived and treated as a crime against ‘society as a whole’”). 
94 See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 
58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975 (1995) (calling such characterizations of battered women a “traumatization model” that 
“provide[s] an inaccurate, reductionist, and potentially demeaning representation of woman battering”). 
95 Reformers adopt an even more stigmatizing form of objectification to account for victim reluctance in the 
absence of evidence of abuser threats. Some characterize battered women who refuse to prosecute as sick and 
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police actors for a number of reasons―money, children, fear of the state, immigration concerns, 
race-related reasons, and even emotional attachment to the abuser.96 By crafting policy under the 
assumption that fear of reprisal is the sole factor keeping women in abusive relationships and 
making them reluctant to prosecute, reformers have done little to address the multifaceted needs 
of many abuse victims.97 This also has more global, negative consequences in that the 
essentialist domestic violence script deflects attention away from the socio-economic antecedents 
of battering.98 Battering has become a problem of individual bad actors rather than a 
phenomenon produced by profound economic inequity, sexist cultural attitudes, and racial and 
other forms of discrimination.99  
The autonomy-stripping aspects of domestic violence reform appear blatantly at odds 
with the philosophical commitments of feminism, given that ending the social and biological 
objectification of women has always been one of the main goals of the American feminist 
movement. From the 1892 case Bradwell v. State, holding that the “natural and proper timidity 
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of 
                                                                                                                                                             
psychologically defective. See, e.g., Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: 
Breaking the Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605 (2000). 
96 See supra notes 87, 89. 
97 See Goodmark, supra note 84, at 4 (“The problem with policies like mandatory arrest is that they reify 
two goals—safety and perpetrator accountability—and marginalize autonomy, serving women who share the goals 
of the system but disenfranchising those with divergent goals.”). 
98 See Gruber, Feminist War, supra note 2, at 814 (arguing that by focusing on the coercive control of the 
abuser “reformers give license to society to ignore its complicity in creating the problems that lead to domestic 
violence”). 
99 See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of “Ideal Victims”: Assaulted Women’s 
“Image Problems” in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 112 (2004) (asserting that “men’s violence against 
women is too pervasive to be understood as a pathology of a few individual men” and “must be analysed within the 




civil life,”100 to more recent incidents like former Harvard President Lawrence Summers’s 
declaration that women are underrepresented in the academic sciences because of the “taste 
preferences” of little girls,101 characterizing women as objects of biology or cultural psychology 
has been an time-honored tactic for silencing the female voice and justifying the oppressive 
status quo. Accordingly, the set of assumptions internalized by the domestic violence reform 
movement have been the subject of intense internal feminist criticism precisely because of the 
obvious self-contradiction—a feminist reform movement utilizing the mechanism of female 
objectification in its effort to amplify domestic violence criminalization.102 
A few more problematic aspects of domestic violence law merit discussion before 
moving on to the neo-feminist critiques of rape law. First, there is the question of the racial 
implications of the domestic violence reform narrative. Above, this Article notes the ways in 
which mandatory policies pose particular harm to abused women who suffer subordination in 
other spheres.103 In addition to that, the characterizations of battered women within the domestic 
violence reform movement operatively exclude women of color. It is true that to gain support 
from skeptical minority women, domestic violence activists emphasized that abuse happens 
                                                 
100 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). 
101 See Lawrence H. Summers, President, Harvard Univ., Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying 
the Science & Engineering Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005), ( transcript available at 
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php). 
102 See HALLEY, supra note 21, at 346 (observing that “representing women as end points of pain, 
imagining them as lacking the agency to cause harm to others and particularly to harm men, feminists refuse also to 
see women—even injured ones—as powerful actors” and thus “[f]eminism objectifies women”); G. Kristian Miccio, 
A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s 
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 242 (2005) (maintaining that mandatory policies “reify[] the cultural stereotypes 
of the incapacitated and irrational woman”). 
103 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
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across the racial and socioeconomic spectrum.104 This particular message, however, was all but 
lost as certain reformers and politicians pursued a larger, more effective, dialectic strategy.  
The most notable catalytic moment for domestic violence awareness was the O.J. 
Simpson murder trial in 1995, which famously involved a celebrated black athlete accused of 
brutally murdering his young, beautiful, white ex-wife and her male friend.105 The prosecution 
presented evidence, in the form of photos of Ms. Simpson’s bruised face, to support that O.J. had 
engaged in domestic violence against her in the past.  Certain activists seized on the political 
climate and utilized the vehicle of popular media to push forward reforms.106 In doing so, the 
domestic violence reform movement, perhaps unintentionally, adopted the oversimplified and 
stereotypical views, popular within victims’ rights parlance, of victims as innocent, non-poor, 
white women.107 The racially specific view of battering victimhood helps explain why women of 
                                                 
104 See, e.g., Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective 
Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 121 
(1991) (stating that “domestic violence occurs in all socio-economic and racial groups”). 
105 See Miccio, supra note 102, at 238 (“With the death of Nicole Brown, politicians raced to the state 
house to invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the “zero tolerance” bandwagon.”). 
106 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 199 (2000) 
(acknowledging that the Simpson trial “provided a major opportunity for national education on the issue of domestic 
violence over the past thirty years.”). 
107 See Laurie L. Levenson, Stereotypes of Women in the O.J. Simpson Case, O.J. Simpson Case 
Commentaries, (Dec. 7, 1994)  available through Westlaw (enter “oj-comment” into the database; then conduct a 
natural language search with the phrase “stereotypes of women”) (“The name Nicole Brown Simpson has now 
become synonymous with the image of the battered wife- -a young, beautiful woman, unable to escape her abuser, 
and unable to get the criminal justice system to respond to her pleas.”); Charisse Jones, Nicole Simpson, in Death, 
Lifting Domestic Violence to the Forefront as National Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/13/us/nicole-simpson-death-lifting-domestic-violence-forefront-national-
issue.html (observing that “Nicole Brown Simpson has unleashed a wave of support for battered women and firmly 
anchored domestic violence in the American psyche as a problem that must be dealt with”). 
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color are more likely to be prosecuted as “mutual combatants” in domestic violence cases rather 
than as victims engaging in self-defense.108  
Nevertheless, the view of domestic violence victims as white might prove to have some 
equalizing effect regarding the racial composition of domestic violence offenders. If the 
quintessential silent, long-suffering abuse victim is a white middle-class woman, then given 
society’s general presumption of continuity of race and class in romantic partnerships, one might 
expect the prevailing image of an abuser to be a non-poor white man. Unfortunately, any image 
of a white middle-class batterer butts up against long entrenched racial fear of violent black and 
Latino men.109 Moreover, domestic violence reform did little to change the problems attendant to 
a discretionary criminal system in a racially stratified society.110 It is therefore no surprise that 
minority men have been disproportionately arrested and prosecuted under our “enlightened” 
domestic violence schemes.111 To the extent that feminism is as much for women of color as for 
white women and it condemns racial hierarchy, it should regard as intolerable legal changes that 
elevate the already insufferable level of racial injustice in the criminal system and society.  
                                                 
108 See Meghan Condon, Bruise of a Different Color: The Possibilities of Restorative Justice for Minority 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 487, 492 (2010) (“Minority women are more 
likely to be arrested than white women, and when they are arrested, they are charged with more serious crimes than 
white women.”). 
109 See N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black 
Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1345 (2004) (noting continued characterization of black men as “sexually 
predatory”); Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 579, 587 (1998) (asserting that “the image of the criminal is the ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, 
violent, Black, or Latino male”).  
110 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 13, 18–19, 53–64 (1998). 
111 See Sarah M. Buel, The Pedagogy of Domestic Violence Law: Situating Domestic Violence Work in Law 
Schools, Adding the Lenses of Race and Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 319 (2003) (citing a 
2001 Milwaukee, Wisconsin study reporting that while blacks represented only twenty-four percent of the 
population, they constituted sixty-six percent of prosecuted domestic violence arrests. By contrast, whites, who 
comprised sixty-two percent of the population, represented only thirty-two percent of prosecuted domestic-violence 
arrests) (citations omitted). 
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 The racially specific media images discussed above, perhaps because they were racially 
specific, did help make the public and government aware of the harm of intimate abuse.112 Even 
conservatives like John Ashcroft and George W. Bush condemned domestic violence as a 
heinous crime.113 Right-leaning political actors embraced domestic violence reform, however, on 
very different philosophical grounds from feminists. Social conservatives cast the problem of 
battering in terms of the destruction of “family values,” even proposing faith-based solutions.114 
They also emphasized that reforms should make women understand their responsibility to utilize 
the now-ample criminal avenues for relief, rather than “choosing” to stay with the abuser.115 
Conservative leaders, in fact, had very little to lose by supporting domestic violence criminal law 
reform. They could appear to take domestic violence seriously, embrace favored tough-on-crime 
solutions, and deflect any pressures to change the underlying socioeconomic disparities that lead 
to battering. 
B. Critiques of Rape Reform 
                                                 
112 See supra notes 105–07. 
113 See John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the Annual Symposium on Domestic Violence 
(Oct. 29, 2002), (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ovw/docs/agremarks.htm)  (asserting that 
“when families are wracked by violence and abuse, [family] values are corrupted”); supra note 70 and 
accompanying text. 
114 See Ashcroft, supra note 113; President George W. Bush, National Domestic Violence Awareness 
Month, 2005, A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, Sept. 30, 2005, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050930-12.html (“Faith-based and 
community organizations are also making vital contributions in the effort to combat domestic violence. These 
organizations are fostering an environment where victims can step out of the shadows and get the help and care they 
need.”). 
115 See Ashcroft, supra note 113 (“One victim of domestic abuse who found help described this 
transformation [of family values] better than I ever could. She said, quote, ‘I finally realized the truth, that I was 
hurting not only myself, but I was hurting my children even more. I was teaching them by example that they 
deserved to be abused and that violence was acceptable.’”).  
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 Moving on to the neo-feminist assessment of rape reform, it is a far more subtle critique 
because rape law did not go in the direction of mandating victim participation in sexual violence 
cases. Thus, the grave autonomy concerns that shadow domestic violence reform simply are not 
present in the rape context. Nonetheless, there are neo-feminist critiques of both the narrative of 
sex-offense law reform and specific legal innovations like rape shield laws and affirmative 
consent standards. The narrative of rape law reform, for the most part, has been one of 
ubiquitous danger.116 Second-wave feminist efforts to convince state actors, jurors, and society 
in general to take rape seriously often involved publicizing statistics attesting to the stunning 
frequency of incidents of rape and their shockingly low reporting levels.117 Later, non-feminist 
crime control activists would use the depiction of an “epidemic” of child predators to push 
through draconian measures to confine and track convicted sex offenders.118 
 Equating sex to fear, danger, and oppression, which also constitutes a central tenet of the 
dominance feminism intervention, engendered quite a bit of push-back, as critical feminists 
expressed concern over the effects of such an equation on women’s autonomy and sexuality. 
“Sex-positive” feminists worry that the relentless focus on the perils of sexual activity threatens 
to stifle women’s sexual agency and expression and even to hinder theorizing on women’s 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Mary P. Koss, Scope, Impact, Interventions and Public Policy Response, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1062, 1062 (1993) (asserting that “uniting all women is the fear of rape”). 
117 See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10–15 (1987). See Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at 
Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. 
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118 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 20464 (Statement of Rep. Ted Poe) (asserting the importance of the Child 
Safety Act to “stop the epidemic of violence and sexual abuse against our children”). 
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sexuality.119 Moreover, critics assert that “the subordination of pleasure to a virtually exclusive 
focus on identifying and preventing danger deprive[s] women of a resource vital to self-
understanding and resistance.”120 Aside from its effect on women’s sexuality, the fear of rape 
plays a significant limiting role in many aspects of women’s lives. The fear of sexual assault is 
often a conditioning factor in women’s decisions about travel, dress, communication, dating, and 
residence.121 Thus, sexual assault serves the “disciplinary function” of compelling women to 
conform to male ideals.122 
 Feminist commentators also argue that some of the rape reforms, which are justifiably 
concerned with how rape victims experience the criminal process, have the effect of reinforcing 
chastity norms. Chastity norms help create an environment in which sexual assault can flourish 
in two principle ways. First, in this era when premarital and casual sex is the standard, chastity 
norms manifest as pre-intercourse linguistic performances. Women may seek to appear chaste by 
refraining from engaging in open and frank communications about impending sexual 
                                                 
119 Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 318–19 
(2008) (“Sex-positive feminist theory points to the capacity of legal reforms aimed at protecting women from 
dangers such as rape, domestic violence, or inequality in the workplace to ultimately strengthen repronormative 
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121 Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
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122 Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1309, 1329–36 (1992); see also Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On 
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 786 (2001) (“Many women believe that they can avoid 
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acts―“playing coy” in the popular vernacular.123 Some may go so far as to feign reluctance.124 
Women’s use of such duplicitous tactics in an effort to engage in culturally appropriate chaste 
sex adds further obfuscation to an interaction already unlikely to involve perfect 
communications. It increases the probability that those seeking sex, who are already inclined to 
interpret all cues in favor of consent, will write off true reluctance as socially required pre-sex 
protestations.125 Second, chastity norms have the effect of disqualifying rape complainants who 
evidence unchaste behavior through dress, past acts, attitude, or social behavior.126 Scholars 
point out that rape shield laws, by presuming that past or present sexual behavior should be 
shielded as private, reinforce such chastity norms.127 On the other hand, given prevalent social 
attitudes towards “loose” women, rape victims can suffer from trial-related revelations of their 
                                                 
123 See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. 
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125 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive 
Access, and Work-Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 952 (2007) (“[I]f women are taught to deny their desire, their 
‘no’s’ appear ambiguous, making it easier for men to believe that ‘no means yes’ . . . .”). 
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Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 94 (2002) (“Instead of championing women’s sexual autonomy, 
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74–80 (2002) (asserting that rape shield laws prevent meaningful juror discussion of female sexuality). 
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sexual behaviors.128 In the end, “anyone who takes up the weapon of privacy in the cause of 
women’s equality must be aware that it is a double-edged weapon.”129 
 The final neo-feminist critique of rape reform, which actually applies with equal force to 
domestic violence reforms, is that the consolidation of feminist efforts in criminal law solutions 
is problematic. First, gender crime-control efforts have strengthened and given moral cover to an 
authoritarian and discriminatory criminal justice system, which in recent decades has been 
instrumental in entrenching an anti-distributive neoliberal ethic in American consciousness. In 
this sense, domestic violence and rape reform appear to be theoretical outliers in a largely leftist 
movement critical of the maintenance of status quo hierarchy.130 Moreover, criminal law’s 
embedded narratives and institutional structure make it a poor mechanism for dismantling 
hierarchy and male domination.131 The very characteristics of American criminal justice 
effectively negate the potential of rape and domestic violence reform to produce sweeping social 
transformation. 
As noted in the beginning of the Article, criminal law experts are, for the most part, in 
agreement that the United States has for several decades seen a tough-on-crime era, in which 
                                                 
128 See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 5, at 638 (observing that “victims value sexual secrecy in a 
world that impugns female sexuality”); Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: 
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129 Martha C. Nussbaum, Is Privacy Bad for Women?, BOS. REV. Apr./May 2000, 
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130 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1–2 (2d ed. 2003). (“Most legal 
writers or practitioners who identify themselves as feminists are critical of the status quo. The root of the criticism is 
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131 See HOOKS, supra note 19, at 118 (describing the American penal system as the very embodiment of 
“the Western philosophical notion of hierarchical rule and coercive authority,” which serves as the “foundation” of 
male domination of women).  
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rehabilitation and forgiveness seem like long-extinct legal dinosaurs.132 The tough-on-crime 
phenomenon, however, did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, crime-centered politics served as the 
foot soldier of the neoliberal revolution in the late 20th century. The neoliberal philosophy of 
rampant individualism, anti-social welfare, and trickle-down economics reached a pinnacle 
during the Reagan eighties.133 The term neoliberalism encompasses not just the conservative 
economists’ backlash against Keynesian economics, but also anti-welfare and privatization 
arguments that took on a moral quality.134 In the neoliberal moral equation, consideration of 
nuance, inequality, and social constraint yields to reductionist dichotomies of public versus 
private and right versus wrong.135 Specifically constructed to serve the interests of this 
philosophy was the war on crime and later the war on drugs. Drug dealers, murderers like Willie 
Horton, and lazy welfare mothers were the essential icons representing the failure of social 
welfare and why there were no excuses for individual wrongdoing.136 With internally evil 
criminals firmly established as the cause of social problems, the state could appear as the white 
                                                 
132 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
133 See Pearson Liddell, Jr. et al., Welfare Reform in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 AM. 
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knight using its police powers to exterminate social blight, while maintaining the appearance of 
small government.137 Thus, if being a feminist means pursuing “a larger, critical agenda 
originating in the experiences of gender subordination,”138 then strengthening the already 
ubiquitous criminal justice system, especially in its current anti-distributive form, appears 
inconsistent with the feminist identity as a philosophical matter. 
Moreover, tough-on-crime philosophy entails a discourse of criminality and victimhood 
which operatively divests rape and domestic violence reform of any potential to produce 
sweeping cultural change. In order to make criminals and victims straw men in the argument for 
neoliberalism, politicians have emphasized particularly evil, individually culpable offenders and 
helpless innocent victims to cast the complex question of how to manage socially undesirable 
behavior into the most simplistic polarization of good victims (and those in solidarity with them) 
and bad criminals.139 This dialogue is infused with racial imagery that exploits long-existing 
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fears of men of color, as this Article previously discussed.140 Aided by the victim’s rights 
movement’s emotional appeal to society at large, which appears ever-eager to cathartically 
identify with “the humbled victims in our midst,”141 the conservative government accrued 
unprecedented penal authority while otherwise dismissing the validity of governance in 
general.142  
 These embedded narratives go far in explaining the dichotomous trajectory of rape law 
reform. On the one hand, reforms aimed at protecting children by indefinitely detaining sexual 
“predators” and intensely tracking convicted sex offenders, which push the law to the very brink 
of constitutionality, are extremely popular.143 By contrast, reform laws that aim to address juror 
bias against adult female complainants, who are not appropriately chaste or virginal, remain 
controversial and ineffective.144 Some experts go so far as to say that the affirmative consent law 
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Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1543 (2005) 
(observing that society despises sexual predators). 
144 Compare Christopher Anderson, DA Candidates Voice Views on Date Rape, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, 
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Groups Think Death Penalty, Other Ideas Could Backfire, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, at 2A, available at 
36 
 
“invites jury nullification.”145 Given the predominant messages of criminal law, how could 
feminists hope to secure date rape convictions against boys who do not look like deviant sickos 
or gang members?146 How could feminists expect jurors to view a sexually experienced co-ed, 
who was out for a night of drinking and fooling around in the same manner as the brutally 
murdered seven-year-old Megan Kanka, Megan’s Law’s namesake?147 It seems that the din of 
voices declaring, ever louder, the war on crime drowned out feminists’ message of gender 
equality. For this reason, conservatives were far more successful at convincing the public that 
rape is a matter of the compulsions of sexual deviants than feminists were at characterizing rape 
as a matter of gender inequality.148 
 Feminist law reform thus became essentially another facet of the criminal justice 
system’s program of jailing bad guys with little regard to the social, economic, cultural, and 
racial complexity of crime. As such, the criminal system absorbs women victims into its punitive 
mission while largely ignoring their material needs and reinforces the social structures that made 
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the women vulnerable to violence in the first place.149 Unfortunately, a collateral harm of the 
domestic violence and rape reform campaigns is that criminalization efforts diverted an 
enormous amount of feminist academic and political capital away from distributive and dialectic 
efforts that could help secure the well-being, not just of women victims, but of all women.150 
This is not to say that feminists were wrong to try to make the criminal system more responsive 
to the needs of gender violence victims. Nor is it an argument that criminal law can never be 
used as a vehicle of anti-subordination. Given the benefit of hindsight, however, the neo-feminist 
is in a position to inject a dose of healthy skepticism into plans for future feminist criminalization 
efforts. Perhaps neo-feminists can even make a compelling argument, at this particular time, for 
taking criminalization off the feminist agenda. 
To conclude, I hope I have made the case that many of the current critical assessments of 
domestic violence and rape reform fit firmly within the feminist theoretical tradition. Addressing 
the issue of gender subordination is as complicated an endeavor as any normative analysis 
regarding a just social state. Moreover, no philosophical theory is immune from attack, criticism, 
or rejection, and in fact such close, critical scrutiny usually inures to the benefit of the theory. As 
a result, feminism accommodates a range of theorizing, as different and perhaps conflicting as 
liberal and Marxist, so long as such theorizing is in the service of women’s empowerment. The 
neo-feminist analysis of gender crime law, although it rejects many aspects of law reform in the 
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area of domestic violence and sex offenses, prioritizes the interests of women victims 
particularly, women generally, and the feminist commitment to larger egalitarianism.  
V. CONCLUSION: SYNTHESIZING THE PRINCIPLES OF NEO-FEMINISM 
In analyzing the neo-feminist response to domestic violence and rape law reform, some 
underlying principles of neo-feminism emerge. A neo-feminist analysis rejects that purely liberal 
strategies, formal equality, and equal rights can solve the problem of women’s subordination. 
However, the answer should not be a pursuance of authoritarian state intervention at all costs. In 
addition, the neo-feminist is wary of both the characterization of women as atomistic rights-
bearers and the essentialist notion that all women suffer similarly from male domination. As a 
consequence, neo-feminist theorizing recognizes the difficulties of both liberal and dominance 
feminism strategies to combat gender crimes and other sex-based inequalities.  
The neo-feminist approach accordingly supports a focus on legal approaches that are 
more responsive to social welfare concerns. Alternatively, it advocates turning the bulk of efforts 
away from purely legal solutions toward policy efforts that transform economic distributions and 
cultural attitudes. In addition, neo-feminism is in a position to gauge the successes and failures of 
second-wave interventions. Rather than being a grand narrative of women’s condition, the neo-
feminist approach can be practical in its support of strategies whose benefits to women’s 
conditions outweigh the drawbacks. As a result, a neo-feminist theory can account for the 
differing ways in which women from different subgroups experience male domination and other 
forms of subordination. 
Understanding these characteristics of neo-feminism, one can sense that legal scholarship 
devoted to women’s issues may be experiencing a “neo-feminist moment.” It appears that 
scholars are analyzing a variety of legal issues in a way that is cognizant of the limits of liberal 
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theory, careful about essentializing women’s experiences, and concerned about state police 
power. In the domestic violence realm, many feminist scholars are questioning the feminist 
commitment to police-power-based strategies.151 Neo-feminist theorizing is also occurring, for 
example, in the realm of international women’s rights and sex trafficking law. In their article, 
From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, 
and Sex Trafficking, Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas analyze 
a variety of feminist issues in transnational and international law, including wartime rape and sex 
trafficking. They remark: 
Our sense at the moment is that a preoccupation with normative achievements 
(message sending, making rape/sexual violence visible, changing hearts and 
minds among elites and across populations) and a legal imaginaire in which 
prohibition would “stop” or “end” conduct harmful to women―or decriminalize 
it in order to liberate them and give scope to their agency―animates the 
[feminist] projects we are studying and detaches them from a certain pragmatic 
attitude and interest in complex distributional consequences that we seek to bring 
to the domain. We are all agreed that we’re working, methodologically, for a new 
legal realism that would anticipate the complex ways in which legal entities meet 
complex societies.152 
 
Similarly, Shelley Cavalieri proposes a “third-way” feminist approach to sex work that “relies on 
the dominance feminist critique of social conditions generative of women’s economic 
desperation, which often underlies women's choice to engage in sexual labor[,]” but “at the same 
time . . . rejects gender essentialism and endorses a liberal notion of the individual woman as an 
actor with real, though constrained, personal autonomy.”153 In the transnational family law arena, 
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Cyra Choudhury observes that the exportation of Western family law norms “include racist and 
neo-imperial judgments about the backwardness of ‘traditional’ women” and advocates that 
liberal feminism “re-orient” itself “to be in partnership and with sensitivity to what local women 
need and desire.”154 Addressing the home/work issue, Laura Kessler suggests a class-conscious 
approach to feminist analysis that recognizes anti-essentialism, emphasizes government 
distribution strategies over private ordering, and incorporates insights from sociology.155 
 These are only a few of many scholarly articles firmly committed to the problem of 
gender subordination, but skeptical of certain liberal and dominance feminist legal devices. Far 
from being anti-feminist or somehow traitorous, neo-feminists enrich feminist legal theory by 
producing scholarship that has the effect of both remedying gender inequities and forging 
connections between women and other subordinated groups. Moreover, rather than being steeped 
in post-modern paradox or definitional-stop,156 neo-feminists are crafting legal and social 
strategies that seek to concretely benefit women, while continuing to recognize the complexities 
of overlapping systems of hierarchy and power. The many neo-feminist contributions in the 
criminal law realm that this Article discusses in Part IV serve to counter the notion that feminists 
are at odds with civil libertarians, race critics, and other progressives, who largely critique the 
current American penal state. Accordingly, this neo-feminist moment in criminal law scholarship 
can be seen as a return to the feminist first principles of non-subordination, distributive equality, 
and skepticism of the status quo.  
                                                 
154 Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law Progress Through International 
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 322 (2011). 
155 Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 915, 918–19 (2008). 
156 Neo-feminist commentary, unlike much postmodern feminist theory, see HALLEY, supra note 21, is not 
particularly concerned with exposing the contingent construction of gender (and even sex) or the seeming 
impossibility of theorizing about group rights in a non-essentialist manner. 
